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Abstract
More than fi ve years after the start of the Sovereign debt crisis in Europe, its impact on labour 
market outcomes is not clear. This paper aims to fi ll this gap. We use qualitative fi rm-level 
data for 24 European countries, collected within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) of the 
ESCB. We fi rst derive a set of indices measuring diffi culties in accessing the credit market 
for the period 2010-13. Second, we provide a description of the relationship between credit 
diffi culties and changes in labour input both along the extensive and the intensive margins 
as well as on wages. We fi nd strong and signifi cant correlation between credit diffi culties 
and adjustments along both the extensive and the intensive margin. In the presence of credit 
market diffi culties, fi rms cut wages by reducing the variable part of wages. This evidence 
suggests that credit shocks can affect not only the real economy, but also nominal variables.
Keywords: credit diffi culties, labour input adjustment, intensive margin.
JEL classifi cation: D53, E24, E44, G31, G32.
Resumen
Más de cinco años después del inicio de la crisis de la deuda soberana en Europa, su 
impacto sobre las variables del mercado laboral no está claro. El objetivo de este documento 
es contribuir a llenar este vacío. Utilizamos datos cualitativos a escala de empresa para 24 
países europeos, recopilados en la Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) del SEBC. Primero, 
construimos un conjunto de índices que miden las difi cultades para acceder al mercado 
crediticio en los 24 países para el período 2010-2013. En segundo lugar, describimos la 
relación entre las difi cultades crediticias y los ajustes en las variables laborales tanto en 
el margen extensivo como intensivo del empleo, así como en los salarios. Encontramos 
una correlación fuerte y signifi cativa entre las difi cultades crediticias y los ajustes a lo largo 
del margen extensivo y del margen intensivo. En cuanto a los salarios, en presencia de 
difi cultades del mercado de crédito, las empresas reducen el componente variable de los 
salarios. 
Palabras clave: difi cultades crediticias, ajuste del mercado laboral, margen intensivo y extensivo.
Códigos JEL: D53, E24, E44, G31, G32.
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1. Introduction 
In many European countries, the beginning of the current decade has been characterized by significant 
and unprecedented difficulties in accessing credit by firms, as well as households and governments. The 
global financial crisis, having originated in 2007 in the US subprime market, and the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis, which hit Europe in the summer of 2011, forced European banks to considerably 
tighten their credit conditions for firms in many economies and for several years.  
Before the global financial crisis, the relationship between credit constraints and employment was 
investigated in the literature, analysing the link between financial development and growth (e.g. Beck 
et al., 2006, Klapper et al., 2006). The global financial crisis has renewed the interest for the effect of 
credit shocks on the real economy (Acharya et al. 2016; Bottero et al., 2015; Cingano et al., 2016; 
Degryse et al., 2016, Berg 2016), and the labour market in particular (Pagano and Pica, 2012; Chodorow-
Reich, 2014; Buera et al., 2015; Duygan-Bump et al., 2015; Bentolila et al., 2017, Berton et al., 2017; 
Hochfellner et al., 2016; Popov and Rocholl, 2016). The existing literature builds primarily on linked 
firm-bank data and examines the impact of exogenous credit supply shocks, making use of the sticky 
lender-borrower relationship. Different types of financial shocks have been examined: Popov and 
Rocholl (2017) focus on the effect of the funding shock of German savings banks during the US 
mortgage crisis, Chodorow-Reich (2014) take advantage of the different exposures of the lenders on the 
syndicated market to mortgage-backed securities in the US, and Bentolila et al. (2016) use the 
differences in Spanish banks’ health at the start of the Great Recession. Other papers derive local-level 
measures of credit supply (e.g. Greenstone et al. 2014). These papers typically focus on a single country, 
and do not analyse the heterogeneity in firms’ adjustments across countries.  
Since the European perspective is fundamental for the European policy makers, in this paper we try to 
fill this gap, by using a unique, fully harmonized survey conducted in 25 European countries by the 
Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), a research network of the European System of Central Banks1. The 
survey, which was the third one conducted by the network and thus is labelled as WDN3 in this paper, 
focusses on the period between 2010 and 2013 and asks firms to report both their difficulties in accessing 
credit and the ways of adjusting labour costs, be it through employment or through wages. Based on the 
                                                          
1 Previous WDN surveys do not allow to make a similar analysis on the impact of credit constrains on labour cost 
adjustments. WDN1 survey did not include any question regarding difficulties in access to finance while WDN2, 
which was an update of WDN1 with small sample sizes and conducted only in 10 European countries, included 
merely one question regarding the extent of difficulties in access to finance for firms. Using this dataset, Fabiani 
et al. (2015), although they focus on demand shocks, find that negative finance shocks increase the likelihood to 
adjust margins and costs at the firm level and once the impact of demand shocks is taken into account, financially 
constrained firms are more likely to adjust non-labour costs.  
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answers of firms (after removing the impact of demand and other shocks), we construct an index of 
credit difficulties, fully comparable across firms in different countries, and we use that to analyse the 
intensity of credit restrictions in different EU countries. Then we relate our index of credit difficulties 
to firms’ labour cost adjustments. First, we find that credit difficulties were extremely heterogeneous 
both within and across countries. According to our estimates, in countries with low average values of 
the credit difficulty index, the within-country variability was also quite low. On the contrary, in the most 
severely hit countries (mainly Southern European and some Eastern European countries) the within-
country variability was remarkably high. If we compare countries, we find that the interquartile range 
(the difference between the 25th and the 75th percentiles) of the distribution of our index in Austria, the 
country registering the lowest level of credit difficulties, was three times lower than that observed in the 
most severely hit countries. Second, we find that European firms hit by a credit shock report more 
frequently a reduction in both employment, confirming the findings of the literature, and wages than 
firms without financing difficulties.  
More precisely, we estimate an increase in the probability to adjust employment by close to 2 pp. (over 
a mean probability of 16%) after a 1 point increase in our index of credit difficulties. As the survey 
collects detailed information on the strategies to adjust labour costs, we can distinguish also between 
adjustment along the extensive and the intensive margin (i.e. reduction in hours per employee). 
Consistently with Berton et al. (2017), who focus on one Italian region, we find that credit supply shocks 
affected both the extensive and the intensive margin. More importantly, we find that the reduction of 
the intensity of the use of labour as a response to a credit shock was not confined to Italy, as found by 
Berton et al. (2017), where subsidized reduction of hours was widely used, but also happened in other 
European countries, mainly through non-subsidized reduction of hours (i.e. part time work 
arrangements).  
Consistently with Bentolila et al. (2016), who focus on Spain, and Caggese and Cuñat (2008), who 
examine the case of Italy, we also find that the probability of an adjustment in case of an adverse credit 
shock was higher for temporary workers. Firms also stopped hiring, with a particularly significant effect 
on the employment opportunities of younger job-seekers. Labour market adjustment as a response to 
credit constraints is thus a potential explanation behind the considerable rise of youth unemployment in 
most European countries (see Hoynes et al., 2012 for the US and Verick, 2009 for European countries 
for a description of how youth unemployment developed following financial crisis).  
In addition to the adjustment in employment, we also investigate the response of wages. The relationship 
between credit shocks and wage dynamics has been neglected so far by the literature, probably because 
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of data constraints and because it has not been clear whether European firms have margins to adjust 
wages. An exception is Hochfellner et al. (2016), who use employer-employee matched data for a 
sample of German firms to examine the impact of credit shocks on earnings, among other factors. We 
find that in our sample an increase of 1 point on our credit difficulty index is associated with an increase 
in the probability to cut wages, by around 1pp. over an average of 14%. Probably because of institutional 
rigidities which prevent cuts of base wages, the impact of credit difficulties is stronger for the flexible 
part of workers’ compensation, whereas the impact on base wage is small and not precisely estimated.  
More importantly, we find that for a given credit supply shock, the reaction of firms is similar across 
Europe. This suggests that the different impact of credit shocks on employment is due to differences in 
the intensity of the shocks across countries rather than to differences in the sensitivity of firms to credit 
restrictions.   
We are aware that our estimates, based on qualitative self-reported information, do not allow for the 
identification of the effect of an exogenous credit supply shock to firms’ labour costs. Firms in the 
WDN3 sample were required to report whether they were hit by many different types of shocks (not 
only credit, but also product demand and volatility shocks, availability of supplies, customers’ inability 
to pay), which allows us to rule out the major part of the effect of the other shocks from our credit supply 
index. Still, our empirical strategy does not allow us to claim for a causal relationship. Our estimation 
strategy, however, is supported by some additional exercises based on matching banks in the credit 
registers of France and Italy with firms in the WDN3 survey (a similar strategy, for Belgium only, is 
used by Cornille et al. 2017). Based on these data, we construct a credit supply shock index which is 
used as an instrumental variable for our survey-based measure of credit difficulties. Within this setting, 
we find that our results for the entire WDN3 sample are fully confirmed.  
This paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we describe the main features of the data and the 
way in which we calculate our index of credit difficulties. In section 4, we show how our index correlates 
with measures about employment and wage adjustments in our sample of firms from 24 EU countries. 
In section 5, we focus on France and Italy and on a sample of WDN3 firms matched with credit register 
data. Last, section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
2. The WDN3 survey 
In this paper we use firm-level survey data collected by the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). The 
Wage Dynamics Network is a research network of the European System of Central Banks, dedicated to 
the study of the features and sources of wage and labour cost dynamics and their implications for 
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monetary policy in the euro area. The first survey on firms’ price and wage setting practices has been 
carried out by 17 national central banks in 2007. Additional questions – mainly to respondents of the 
first wave – have then been issued in a second wave in 2009, in order to assess the firms’ initial reaction 
to the global financial crisis that hit Europe in 2008. The third survey, the results of which are used in 
this paper, was conducted in 2014 by national central banks in 25 countries of the European Union. It 
covers the 2010-2013 period, and was answered by over 25,000 firms (see Izquierdo et al. 2017 for 
details).  
Since late 2009, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, several European countries have been confronted 
with the severe sovereign debts crisis, which, together with more stringent regulation about capital 
requirements and the related tightening of credit standards, transmitted into the second phase of the 
double-dip recession (2011-2013) in the European Union as a whole. Firms were hit by adverse demand 
and credit shocks, and both types of shocks affected their strategies to adjust their labour input during 
2010-13. Therefore, the third wave of the WDN survey (WDN3) was designed specifically to 
differentiate between the different shocks (to product demand, demand volatility, credit availability, 
customers' ability to pay and supply availability) and their intensity, as well as to explore firms’ 
adjustment strategies during this period. Special attention was given to firms’ adjustments of labour 
input, wage dynamics and wage settings practices. For a more detailed description of the WDN3 survey, 
see Appendix 1.  
This paper uses four sets of questions from the survey (see Table A2 in the Appendix for the exact list 
of the questions). First, we use the questions on credit availability and credit conditions. Six questions 
aim at capturing the taxonomy in the severity of credit constraints. They consider both the worsening in 
the quantity or access to credit and the costs and conditions of credit supplied by the banks. Firms were 
also asked to qualify the intensity of the difficulties. Both the questions on access to credit and credit 
conditions were asked in relation to three types of requested credit (financing working capital, financing 
new investments, refinance debt).  
Second, a group of questions was asked on the changes in economic conditions faced by the firms during 
2010-13. Firms could choose between five symmetrical responses describing the change in level of 
demand, volatility of demand, customers' ability to pay and availability of supplies (the potential 
answers were: strong decrease, moderate decrease, unchanged, moderate increase, strong increase). We 
use these questions to control for the effects of other shocks, deriving an uncorrelated measure of credit 
difficulties.  
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Third, several questions were asked on the channels of labour market adjustments used by the firms 
during 2010-13. Firms were asked if they needed to significantly reduce their labour input or to alter its 
composition. Firms that needed to adjust their labour input were asked about the exact way of doing so 
(e.g. layoffs, reduction of hours, freeze of new hires, etc.). We use these questions to make a distinction 
between the extensive and the intensive margins of labour adjustment. Adjustment along the extensive 
margin is defined as individual or collective layoffs, while the intensive margin is defined as a reduction 
of working hours per worker (be it unsubsidised or carried out in the framework of subsidized schemes). 
Finally, some questions allow us to measure the propensity of firms to adjust base and variable wages. 
(For a description of the labour adjustment please see Table A3 in the Appendix.) We combine these 
four sets of data and control for firm-level characteristics to examine the connection between credit 
shocks and labour adjustment. 
 
3. Measuring credit difficulties using WDN3 
Using the questions about credit difficulties, we construct firm-specific indices of credit constraints, 
comparable for 24 EU countries included in the WDN3 survey. Data for Ireland are excluded as answers 
about the availability of credit are not collected for this country. We focus on firms in manufacturing, 
trade and business services sectors (we call the latter two sectors together private services). Our final 
sample consists of around 19,000 firms2. See Table A1 for a description of our sample. 
A look at the raw data confirms the high cross-country heterogeneity. Table 1 reports the share of firms 
stating that the lack of credit for a given purpose, or the cost of credit was a relevant or very relevant 
problem. Over 40% of firms in Greece, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovenia report that credit difficulties were 
relevant or very relevant for their activity, but the values are also high for Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Cyprus. While in Greece, Slovenia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus the high values are likely to reflect 
the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on financial intermediation, in Poland the reason may be the high 
share of self-financing (Strzelecki and Wyszynski, 2016). In Malta and Austria, on the other hand, only 
a minor proportion of firms faced difficulties in getting credit. Within firms, the responses about the 
                                                          
2 Firms’ non-response to the credit availability questions is not homogenous across countries. In the UK, almost 
30% of firms in manufacturing, trade and business services sectors haven't provided answers to this block of 
questions. In Greece this share is 12%, followed by Hungary (9%), Latvia (9%) and Italy (8%). In the remaining 
of the countries the non-response rate was smaller.  
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difficulties to obtain credit for different purposes are highly correlated. This explains why the average 
share of firms reporting problems to obtain credit is similar for different credit types within one country.  
Relying on the high correlation between the six credit availability measures and combining both 
conditions and quantity aspects of credit availability, we derive a unique comparable measure of credit 
difficulties across European countries via principal component analysis (PCA)3. Before applying PCA, 
we remove the part of the correlation which could be due to other shocks hitting firms and affecting also 
their ability to access credit. To do so, we first regress our basic measures of credit restrictions on 
variables measuring demand and demand volatility shocks, customers’ ability to pay, the availability of 
supplies and firms’ characteristics, such as sector and size. We use the residuals of these six regressions 
to carry out the PCA.  
The descriptive statistics of the obtained components is given in Table 2. The first principal component 
explains 70% of the total variance in credit difficulty measures and has positive loadings of roughly 
similar size for all the six questions, therefore representing the overall credit difficulty for a firm.  
Figure 1 reports the average firm scores of the “credit difficulty index” by country, as measured by the 
first principal component. Countries are ranked according to their average level of firms’ credit 
difficulties. The values are normalized around the average level of credit indexes for all countries. Thus, 
values above zero reflect above-average levels of credit difficulty. As mentioned above, in 2010-13 the 
countries with above-average values were Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Greece. 
The distribution of countries by credit difficulty is quite symmetric, with a roughly similar number of 
countries experiencing above-average and below-average level of credit problems.  
The lower graph of Figure 1 shows the distribution of the obtained credit difficulty indices by country, 
with the lower and upper borders representing the 25th and the 75th percentiles, respectively. The line in 
the box shows the median. In all countries, the distribution of the credit difficulty index has a long 
positive tail, suggesting that even in countries where a majority of the firms had no credit difficulties, 
quite a large minority faced financing problems. Austria and Malta are extreme cases, where over 75% 
of firms had the same low level of credit difficulty. In Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Greece, the 
distribution of the credit difficulty index is more even. In these countries the occurrence of both the very 
low and the very high values of the credit difficulty indices were rare and the majority of firms had 
similar, relatively severe credit access problems. All in all, the figure shows the presence of high 
                                                          
3 As robustness check we derive credit difficulty index using factor analysis. The obtained results lead to the same 
findings. The difference in the size of the marginal effects using both measures (with standardized variance) is 
negligible. 
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heterogeneity of credit difficulties across EU countries: the interquartile range (the difference between 
the 25th and the 75th percentile of the distribution) of the index of credit difficulties in Austria is around 
three times lower than that observed in Italy or in Greece. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the derived credit difficulty index for all countries in the sample, 
weighing observations to reflect total employment in the countries. The large mass in the negative 
interval reflects the high weight of France, Austria and Germany in the total sample of firms and rather 
good credit availability in these countries. The right tail is much longer and mostly positive, reflecting 
the overall severity of credit conditions for many firms. 
To cross-check whether our index indeed captures the credit difficulties that we intend to measure, we 
compare it with external data sources. For this cross-check, we first look at the Survey on the access to 
finance of enterprises (SAFE), conducted by the ECB and the European Commission since 2009. The 
SAFE Survey is comparable to the WDN Survey in the sense that it measures credit difficulties as 
perceived by the firms, and not by the banks as a supplier of credit. The SAFE survey collects data from 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Europe asking, among other things, what the most 
pressing problem for firms during the reference period is. Figure 3, panel a, is based on the 2013 SAFE 
survey and refers to the same period as the WDN3. It compares the share of firms reporting at least one 
obstacle in obtaining a (bank) loan in the SAFE survey in 2013 (on the vertical axis) to the country level 
average of the index of access to finance from the WDN survey (horizontal axis). The figure confirms 
the high correlation between the two measures.  
The ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS) provides another possibility to validate our results, by looking 
at credit conditions from the banks’ perspective. The BLS was launched in 2003 by the ECB to enhance 
the Eurosystem’s knowledge of the financing conditions in the euro area. It can be seen as the European 
equivalent of the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices in the US. In the BLS, 
a sample of banks is asked every quarter about, among others, how they changed their credit standards 
in the previous three months for loans to non-financial enterprises. We have extended the ECB sample 
of the euro area countries with data from the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, making use of data 
collected and published by national central banks. For each country and every quarter, a net percentage 
of banks tightening (+) and loosening (-) their credit conditions is reported. Figure 3, panel b reports, on 
the vertical axis, the average of the net percentages of tightening banks for each country during the 16 
quarters over 2010Q1 to 2013Q4 (2012Q1-2013Q4 for CZ). The horizontal axis shows the first principal 
component from the WDN3. The positive correlation between the BLS-measure of credit supply 
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conditions and the WDN-measure of firms’ difficulties in obtaining finance, gives confidence to our 
interpretation of the first principal component as a supply measure of credit difficulties. 
Finally, Figure 4 plots the correlation between our credit difficulty index and important labour market 
macro variables, drawn from national accounts, measuring changes in the use of labour (measured by 
total hours worked) and nominal hourly wages during the period 2010-13. Figure 4 shows that there is 
a clear negative correlation between the change in employment at the macro level and our index of credit 
difficulties. A (weaker) negative correlation also arises between credit difficulties and nominal wage 
growth. This preliminary look at the aggregate data gives some comfort to our interpretation of the credit 
difficulty index and provides a strong motivation for our micro analysis. 
 
4. Credit market access and labour adjustments: evidence from microdata 
The aggregate data may hide considerable differences across firms. Thus, we look at the micro data to 
see whether the correlation between credit difficulties and labour adjustment is observable on the firm 
level and if there are any differences in terms of the type of adjustment. Furthermore, the countries 
analysed in this study have very different labour market institutions, which can affect the firms’ response 
to shocks. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look at several different channels of adjustment.  
Starting with the total adjustment (question about the need to reduce labour input), adjustments along 
the extensive margin (i.e. if the firm undertook individual or collective layoffs) and adjustments along 
the intensive margin (subsidised as well as non-subsidised reductions of hours), we construct a set of 
dummy variables equal to 1 if firm i adjusted its labour input using a specific method of adjustment k, 
and zero otherwise.4 We also look at the other instruments to adjust labour input and in particular at 
firms that stopped new hiring and did not renew temporary job contracts. These outcomes are 
particularly relevant, because they help understanding the impact of the sovereign debt crisis on specific 
dimensions of the European labour markets, for example the rise in youth unemployment, which could 
have been particularly affected by the stop in hiring, and the segmentation between temporary and 
permanent job contracts.  
                                                          
4 The dummy for the adjustment on the extensive margin is equal to 1 if the firm answered that individual and/or 
collective layoffs were used moderately or strongly, and 0 otherwise. The dummy for the intensive margin is 
equal to 1 if the firm answered that the decrease of hours worked per worker, either subsidised or non-
subsidised, was used moderately or strongly, and 0 otherwise.  
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We do not limit our analysis to employment changes, but we also look at adjustments in wages as a 
response to credit difficulties. Data limitations have prevented analysing this relationship until now. 
Based on the WDN survey, however, we can check whether firms adjusted base and variable wage 
components in response to credit shocks. 
To check for a correlation between labour cost adjustments and the measures of credit market difficulties 
described in Section 3, we consider the following baseline specification: 
[1] ????????? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?????????????????? ? ? ? ??+ui 
where  
- adj_ki is a dummy variable on k-th type of labour market adjustment for firm i (equal to 1 in 
case of strong or moderate decrease in the use of the method of adjustment),  
- credit_difficultyi constraint is the measure of credit constraint experienced by firm i, i.e. credit 
difficulties is a vector of firm-level control variables, which in all models correspond to country, 
sector and size dummies.  
The results on labour input adjustments are reported in Table 3 and 4 and on wage adjustments in Table 
5. 
As shown by Table 3, the index of credit market difficulty correlates positively with the probability to 
adjust labour input, a result which is in line with the current literature on the employment effect of credit 
shocks. Our findings, however, suggest that adjustments took place along both the extensive and the 
intensive margins, although with a somewhat higher intensity in the case of the extensive margin. In 
particular, we estimate an increase in the probability to adjust employment by close to 2 pp. (over a 
mean probability of 16%) after a 1 point increase in our index of credit difficulties. This result is also 
robust to the inclusion of additional controls such as the share of labour costs in total costs, the share of 
flexible labour costs, and dummies on the degree of firm´s autonomy, structure and ownership.  
This result is confirmed also if we look separately at all the methods to adjust labour input (Table 4). 
For all the methods, credit market difficulties are always positively correlated to the probability to adjust 
firm workforce. Results show that firms more strongly affected by credit difficulties as measured by our 
index tend to use individual layoffs to adjust their labour force more than collective or temporary layoffs, 
probably reflecting higher institutional rigidities to use these alternative methods of adjustment. Also, 
credit difficulties are positively associated with the freeze or reduction of new hires and the non-renewal 
of temporary contracts, while the impact on early retirement or temporary agency workers is more 
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limited. On the intensive margin, firms hit by credit shocks tend to use non-subsidised reduction of hours 
with a higher probability, while higher credit difficulties are not significantly associated with a higher 
incidence of subsidised reductions of working hours, probably because the possibility to access 
subsidised reduction of hours worked (available on a large scale only in a few countries) allow firms to 
hoard labour, and the related decline of labour costs relax the financing difficulties. 
Table 5 reports the marginal effect of worsening credit conditions on the probability to adjust wages. 
Our estimates confirm the positive correlation between credit market difficulties and the adjustment of 
wages, reflecting their impact on the adjustment of flexible wages (increasing this probability by almost 
1 pp.). By contrast, the impact on base wages is not significant, possibly showing the larger institutional 
rigidities to adjust base wages in European countries (on average, just 5% of European firms adjusted 
base wages over this period). 
In other specifications we include an interaction term between our index of credit difficulties and firms’ 
characteristics, to check whether there are country specific factors affecting the response of labour 
market variables to credit shocks. The interaction of the credit difficulty index with other variables 
related to firm’s characteristics show very similar results, suggesting that the effect of credit market 
conditions on labour adjustments was rather similar across types of firms (estimates are available upon 
request). 
We then look more closely at country heterogeneity. We define three geographical areas corresponding 
to (i) Continental Europe and UK, (ii) Eastern European and Baltic countries and (iii) Southern European 
countries. The grouping is based on differences in the financial sector. Firms in Continental Europe and 
in the UK are typically less dependent on banks for their financial needs (this is true especially for UK, 
see Brown et al, 2009) and are characterized by lower leverage (see e.g. Bach Outlook no.2, 2014). 
Eastern European and Baltic countries are grouped together because their banking sectors are 
characterized by a large market share of foreign banks, and a considerable degree of dependence on 
banking finance. Finally, in the Southern European countries the banking sector suffered the most during 
the period 2010-13 because of their exposure to sovereign debt risk. We interact the index of credit 
difficulties with area dummies to check the differences in the elasticity of employment to credit 
difficulties in the different areas. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6. Interestingly, we 
do not find much evidence that the elasticity of employment to credit shocks was different across these 
countries. In particular, no significant differences are found between group (i) and (iii) in any method 
of labour cost adjustment, although the impact of credit difficulties on the employment adjustment in 
the intensive margin and flexible wage adjustment seems to be lower in the Eastern European and Baltic 
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countries. More detailed estimates in which the credit difficulty index is interacted with country 
dummies give the same picture, suggesting that the heterogeneous reaction of the EU labour markets in 
response to the sovereign debt crisis is mainly explained by the differences in the intensity of the crisis 
across countries.  
5.  Causality: Evidence from France and Italy  
Our index of credit difficulties has been calculated after removing the impact of common shocks, 
however, it is still possible that there is endogeneity, i.e. the credit difficulty index partially reflects 
credit demand shocks. For instance, it is possible that a demand shock explains both the adjustment of 
labour input and wages and a rejection of access to credit. 
To solve this problem, we carry out an instrumental variable examination for Italy and France. We merge 
the WDN3 sample with credit register data in the two countries. Credit registers include all loans above 
EUR 25,000 in France and EUR 30,000 in Italy, and both databases include identifiers that make it 
possible to link the firms with the WDN3 and identify their financing banks.  
Credit register data are used to construct an index of credit supply very similar in spirit to Amiti and 
Weinstein (2016) which can be assigned to the firms in the WDN sample. We consider the universe of 
banks in Italy and France from 2007 to 2013, i.e. before the burst of the global financial crisis and after 
the sovereign debt crisis. Aggregating loan data by bank, we calculate the three-year percentage change 
in total loans for each bank. This way we remove bank fixed effects. We then carry out the simple 
regression [2] to remove a time trend t, aimed at capturing demand factors and supply invariant 
characteristics.  
[2]      ????? ? ? ? ?? ? ??  
Last, we take the residuals of [2], and in particular residuals in year 2013,??????????. Finally, we assign 
the residual of the change in loans observed in the period 2010-2013 to each WDN firm. Firms have 
multiple bank relationships, thus, we weight each residual with the share of loans ?????????? of firm f 
(in the WDN sample) in the total amount of loans of the firm with any bank b in the register in 2009, 
i.e. the year preceding the survey reference period, to limit the impact of possible selection bias in the 
firm-bank relationship. In particular we calculate the index of credit supply to firm f, ????? as: 
[3]    ??? ? ? ??????????????????? ?,?????????? 
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This procedure leads to an imperfect match between the two datasets and we get around 750 observations 
per country. We normalize the two indices and pool the two datasets. Figure 4 compares the index of 
credit difficulties drawn from the WDN survey with this measure of credit supply change. As expected, 
the two indices are negatively correlated. We then use our measure of credit supply as an instrument for 
the index of credit difficulties.  
The results are reported in Table 7 (the models also include sector and size dummies and a country 
dummy). The first column refers to the first stage estimation. The correlation between the two indices 
is highly significant. Columns 2-5 show the estimated probabilities to reduce the extensive margin, the 
intensive margin, the base wage and the variable wage, respectively. The results are substantially 
confirmed. The impact of credit difficulties on the probability to reduce labour is always positive. The 
same holds for flexible wages, but not for base wages, as found in the examination of all countries. In 
line with the exceptions, the IV results on base wages also show that the reaction of firms to the credit 
shock is larger than those obtained by simple OLS regressions presented in Tables 3-5 (and similar to 
OLS regressions carried out only for Italy and France). Thus, the results of Tables 3-5 can be viewed as 
a lower bound for the effect of a credit shock on the European labour markets. 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper we provide empirical evidence about a strong correlation between credit shocks and labour 
market adjustments in Europe. We rely on survey data, which has the advantage to offer a unique 
European perspective, providing comparable, harmonised results for 24 countries.  
We are aware of the limits of our approach. First, the data allow us to calculate only the probability of 
an adjustment and not how much of the observed employment drop can be imputed to credit difficulties. 
Second, since we use survey data on self-reported credit difficulties and other shocks, our index of credit 
difficulty does not allow for a proper identification of the credit supply shock hitting the various 
countries, net of any demand effect. Thus, our main estimates are simple correlations between credit 
difficulties and firms’ labour cost adjustment strategies. A more precise identification, however, is 
available for France and Italy, thanks to the possibility to merge credit register data with our survey data. 
Even with this limitation, our results confirm that credit shocks are important determinants of labour 
market fluctuation in Europe. More importantly, the reaction to adverse credit shocks was quite similar 
across areas, the total effect being determined only by the different intensity of credit difficulties across 
countries.  
Credit market difficulties are associated not only with a decrease in employment, but also a decline in 
the intensity of the use of labour. One of our main findings is that after the sovereign debt crisis, standard 
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measures of labour market slack, like the unemployment rate, probably under-estimate the unutilized 
labour in Europe. Our results suggest also that European firms reduced nominal wages, by cutting the 
variable part of employee compensation (bonuses, performance related premia, etc.). Thus, credit 
difficulties may have consequences not only on real variables but also on nominal ones, through their 
effects on wages (for an analysis on the impact of credit difficulties on prices, see also Duca et al. 2017). 
This interaction has potentially important consequences for monetary policy and asks for future research 
on this topic. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: Share of firms in manufacturing, trade and business services, who viewed that credit 
access problem in 2010-2013 (as described in the credit accessibility questions) was relevant or 
very relevant, % 
  
Credit was NOT available to  Credit was available to   
finance working 
capital 
finance new 
investment 
refinance 
debt 
finance working 
capital, 
finance new 
investment, refinance debt, 
but conditions were too onerous 
AT 5.4 3.6 1.5 4.3 2.0 0.9 
BE 16.3 20.8 15.9 17.7 18.0 12.0 
BG 52.2 51.5 44.3 53.4 52.6 49.6 
CY 36.8 35.0 30.8 35.7 31.0 28.9 
CZ 12.3 13.7 10.5 18.2 18.5 15.2 
DE 10.0 9.2 8.9 7.7 6.6 5.9 
EE 11.0 13.3 7.3 14.1 13.3 8.0 
ES 32.5 32.8 29.5 38.4 38.2 34.3 
FR 14.0 16.1 11.4 8.2 8.3 6.7 
GR 56.3 53.1 46.5 54.2 41.9 46.2 
HR 30.9 28.7 22.1 39.3 41.1 35.3 
HU 9.1 10.5 9.5 26.5 26.4 24.4 
IT 29.3 39.2 27.0 34.9 27.6 33.4 
LT 24.1 19.1 12.3 27.9 21.4 14.6 
LU 17.1 23.0 13.5 15.9 15.1 10.3 
LV 33.0 22.8 17.3 28.8 24.3 18.4 
MT 4.6 3.1 1.5 6.1 6.2 2.3 
NL 23.4 26.2 16.8 18.4 19.4 13.5 
PL 51.3 46.8 23.5 47.7 43.5 26.7 
PT 31.4 31.3 25.3 42.8 40.5 33.7 
RO 21.2 21.0 16.2 31.7 29.4 24.7 
SI 46.4 46.6 36.7 47.3 47.4 40.9 
SK 26.4 34.5 19.8 33.6 38.8 26.8 
UK 28.7 26.6 21.6 24.4 24.3 24.6 
Note: 
Frequency. Data weighted by employment weight.  
 
Table 2: Principal component analysis of the credit difficulty measures 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative Loading 1 
1 4.353 3.605 0.726 0.726 0.403 
2 0.748 0.392 0.125 0.850 0.403 
3 0.356 0.110 0.059 0.910 0.404 
4 0.246 0.088 0.041 0.950 0.416 
5 0.158 0.018 0.026 0.977 0.411 
6 0.140 . 0.023 1.000 0.412 
Note: 
PCA on answers about credit difficulties, after removing variables measuring demand and volatility shocks, difficulties in 
customers’ ability to pay, availability of supplies, sector and size dummies. 
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Table 3: Labour input adjustments and credit availability. Probit marginal effects 
(1) 
Adjust labour input 
(2) 
Adjust the extensive 
margin 
(3) 
Adjust the intensive 
margin 
        
Index of credit difficulties 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] 
    
Observations 18,139 18,130 17,068 
Mean probability 0.303 0.156 0.116 
Note: 
Robust p-values in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The models include country, sector and size dummies. 
 
 
Table 4: Labour input adjustments and credit availability, by detailed method of adjustment. 
Probit marginal effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Collective layoffs Individual layoffs Temporary layoffs 
        
Index of credit difficulties 0.002** 0.017*** 0.001 
 [0.270] [0.000] [0.502] 
    
Observations 18,133 18,134 13,403 
Mean probability 0.061 0.121 0.038 
 
(4) 
Subsidized 
reduction of hours 
(5) 
Not subsidized 
reduction of hours 
(6) 
No renewal of 
temporary job 
contracts 
       
Index of credit difficulties 0.004 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 [0.143] [0.000] [0.003] 
    
Observations 15,853 18,128 18,131 
Mean probability 0.071 0.071 0.125 
 
(7) 
Early retirement 
(8) 
Freeze/reduction 
new hire 
(9) 
Reduction 
temporary work 
agency 
    
Index of credit difficulties 0.003* 0.013*** 0.007** 
 [0.090] [0.001] [0.019] 
    
Observations 17,391 18,133 18,129 
Mean probability 0.044 0.170 0.099 
Note: 
Robust p-values in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The models include country, sector and size dummies. 
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Table 5: Wage adjustments and credit availability, base wage and variable wage components. 
Probit marginal effects 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Wages (total) Base wages Flexible wages 
        
Index of credit difficulties 0.009** 0.002 0.009*** 
 [0.016] [0.188] [0.004] 
    
Observations 18,282 18,282 18,282 
Mean probability 0.142 0.050 0.123 
Note: 
Robust p-values in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The models include country, sector and size dummies. 
 
Table 6: Credit availability and labour market adjustments by geographical area. Probit marginal 
effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin Base wage 
Flexible 
wage 
     
Credit difficulties index 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.001 0.009** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.700] [0.036] 
Southern Europe * Credit diff. Index 0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.010 
 [0.793] [0.520] [0.835] [0.211] 
Eastern/Baltic  * Credit diff. Index -0.014* -0.009 0.002 -0.014** 
 [0.058] [0.109] [0.423] [0.017] 
Observations 18,130 17,068 18,282 18,282 
Mean probability 0.156 0.116 0.050 0.123 
Note: 
Robust p-values in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Southern Europe includes: Spain, Italy; Greece, Portugal, Cyprus. 
Eastern Europe/Baltic countries includes: Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. The models include area, country, sector and size dummies 
 
Table 7: Italy and France. Instrumental variables. Pooled data. Credit supply as an instrument 
for credit access difficulties and labour market adjustments  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Index of 
credit 
difficulties 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin Base wage 
Flexible 
wage 
            
IV: index of credit supply -1.212     
 [0.000]**     
Index credit difficulties 
(instrumented)  0.141 0.122 0.028 0.107 
  [0.011]** [0.033]** [0.219] [0.045]** 
Observations 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,603 1,603 
Note: 
Index pf credit supply, based on credit registers. Robust p-values in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The models 
include country, sector and size dummies. 
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Figure 1: Country averages of credit difficulty index and box-plot analysis of firm level variation 
 
Note:  
Sample is restricted to manufacturing, trade and business service firms. 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of credit accessibility index 
 
Note: Sample is restricted to manufacturing, trade and business service firms. Data weighted to reflect an overall employment 
in the country.  
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Figure 3: Correlations of the results of SAFE survey on firms and BLS on banks, and index of 
credit difficulties. 
 
Note:  
Panel a: Safe survey, share of firms reporting credit availability as the more pressing problem and index of credit difficulty 
(mean values for each country). Panel b: Safe survey, share of banks reporting a tightening in conditions and index of credit 
difficulty (mean values for each country).  
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Figure 4: Correlations between adjustments in employment (total hours worked, panel (a)  and 
nominal hourly wages (panel b) and index of credit difficulties. 
 
Note:  
National accounts (Private sector only) and index of credit difficulty (mean values for each country).  
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Figure 5: Correlations between the change in credit supply and the index of credit difficulties. 
 
Note:  
Credit supply (measured on credit registers and normalized between zero and one in both countries) and index of credit 
difficulty.  
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Appendix 1: The WDN3 survey 
In this paper we use so-called WDN3 survey, conducted in 2014 by national central banks in 24 countries 
of the European Union. This survey constitutes the main data source we use to deal with these issues. 
This survey is the third wave of enquiries led by the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) of the European 
System of Central Banks, a research network dedicated to the study of the features and sources of wage 
and labour cost dynamics and their implications for monetary policy in the euro area. The first survey 
on firms’ price and wage setting practices has been carried out by 17 national central banks in 2007-
2008. Additional questions –mainly to respondents of the first wave– have then been issued in a short 
second wave in 2009, in order to assess the firms’ reaction to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Since late 2009, the European countries have been confronted to the sovereign debts crisis, and labour 
market reforms have occurred: the third wave was designed to measure the nature of shocks and the 
firms’ reaction during the period 2010-2013, and especially the adjustments they made in their price and 
wage settings practices. The harmonised questionnaire contains three main parts: the nature of the 
shocks (changes in demand, in accessibility of funding, costs and mainly elements of the labour costs), 
the adjustments on employment and wages, and the main obstacles to hiring. 
Each participating national central bank was responsible for the translation of the questionnaire and for 
the conduct of the survey in the country. Each central bank chose both the sample computation and the 
data collection method for its national data, leading to a large variety of sample computation and data 
characteristics. More than 24 000 firms were surveyed during the year 2014: if the perimeter of sectors 
can differ from a country to another, the manufacturing, trade, business services and, to a lesser extent, 
construction are well represented across the participating countries. To improve firm comparability 
between countries we restrict our analysis to the three main sectors – manufacturing, trade and business 
services (see Table A1 for detailed information on sample). 
In most countries, firms with less than 5 employees were excluded from the survey: they only represent 
2% of the data. 29% of firms have 5 to 19 employees, 24% 20 to 49, 25% 50 to 199 and 20% more than 
200 employees. For all countries we only include firms with at least 5 employees.  
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Table A1: Survey sample by country, sector and size (firms that provided answers about credit availability) 
Country 
Number of firms that 
provided answers about 
credit availability (all 
sectors) 
Share of firms in 
manufacturing, trade 
or business services 
(%) 
Firms in manufacturing, trade or business services 
Average item non-response (% 
of total number of firms) 
distribution by sector (%) distribution by employee number (%) 
for credit 
availability 
questions 
for labour input 
adjustment 
questions 
  
manufacturing trade 
business 
services < 5  5-19  20-49  50-199 200 and > 
AT 744 83.9 34.8 25.8 39.4 0.6 18.1 22 31.6 27.7 1.9 3.2 
BE 958 77.5 54.3 14.8 30.9  - 22.8 23.9 42.6 10.8 2.1 0.6 
BG 507 75.9 14 59.5 26.5  - 72.5 18.2 7 2.3 1.4 0 
CY 167 85 22.5 32.4 45.1 26.1 41.5 15.5 9.9 7 5.4 2.6 
CZ 944 91.5 54.5 16.1 29.4  - 15.4 18.9 25.8 39.9 4.7 1.8 
DE 2297 80.8 34 28.1 37.9 9.2 24 28 27.2 11.7 3.8 2.9 
EE 500 76.6 35 24 41  - 36 34.7 23.2 6 0 0 
ES 1975 99.1 25.9 30.7 43.5  - 73.1 18 6.6 2.3 0 0 
FR 1120 85.4 51.4 25.2 23.4  - 18.4 22.2 27.7 31.7 2.6 0.8 
GR 348 100 39.4 35.3 25.3  - 11.2 36.2 34.8 17.8 11.5 2.0 
HR 301 90.4 42.6 21 36.4  - 30.1 25.7 33.1 11 0 0 
HU 1782 90.1 43.7 23.6 32.7  - 10.5 29.5 40.1 19.9 9.2 0 
IT 919 97.6 51.7 21.1 27.2  - 6.7 51.4 29 12.5 8.3 0.5 
LT 515 77.3 19.1 42.5 38.4  - 57.5 19.3 18.3 4.8 0 0 
LU 661 64.9 17.2 35.9 46.9 23.5 35.7 21.9 14.9 4 1.3 0 
LV 463 85.3 20.8 36.7 42.5  - 47.6 25.8 20.8 5.8 8.6 0 
MT 178 73 24.6 20 55.4  - 13.8 24.6 37.7 23.8 0 0 
NL 727 58.2 22.9 34.8 42.3  - 45.6 25.8 24.3 4.3 0 0 
PL 1414 84.4 33.9 34 32.1 20.8 27.9 15.3 22.4 13.7 3.5 4.8 
PT 1261 70.9 47.5 20.4 32.1  - 13.4 23.6 36.4 26.6 3.7 0 
RO 2030 89.4 60.4 16.1 23.5  -  - 8.2 14.7 77.1 0.4 0.1 
SI 1269 80.9 40.8 20.1 39.1  - 48.3 20 20.5 11.2 0 0 
SK 601 84.7 37.3 24.4 38.3  - 25.9 27.3 32.6 14.1 2.1 0 
UK 395 72.4 23.1 19.2 57.7 5.6 6.6 24.1 28.7 35 29.6 0.8 
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Table A2. List of the WDN3 questions used in this paper 
C
r
e
d
i
t
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
With regard to finance, please indicate for 2010-2013 how relevant were for your firm each one of the following happenings? Please choose ONE 
option for each line (not relevant, of little relevance, relevant, very relevant). Note: Credit here refers to any kind of credit, not only bank credit. 
Credit was not available to finance working capital    
Credit was not available to finance new investment  
Credit was not available to refinance debt 
Credit was available to finance working capital, but conditions (interest rate and other contractual terms) were too onerous 
Credit was available to finance new investment, but conditions (interest rate and other contractual terms) were too onerous 
Credit was available to refinance debt, but conditions (interest rate and other contractual terms) were too onerous                                                            
L
a
b
o
u
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
During 2010-2013 did you need to significantly reduce your labour input or to alter its composition? (Yes/No) 
If YES, which of the following measures did you use to reduce your labour input or alter its composition when it was most urgent? Please choose 
ONE option for each line (not at all, marginally, moderately, strongly) 
Collective layoffs 
Individual layoffs 
Temporary layoffs (NOT asked in: CZ, DE, EE, IT, LT, LV and MT) 
Subsidised reduction of working hours (NOT asked in EE, LT, LV, UK and PT) 
Non-subsidised reduction of working hours (including reduction of overtime)  
Non-renewal of temporary contracts at expiration 
Early retirement schemes (NOT asked in EE) 
Freeze or reduction of new hires 
Reduction of agency workers and others 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
How did the following factors affect your firm’s activity during 2010-2013? Please choose ONE  option for each line (Strong decrease, Moderate 
decrease, Unchanged, Moderate increase, Strong increase) 
 
The level of demand for your products/services 
Volatility/uncertainty of demand for your products/services 
Customers’ ability to pay and meet contractual terms 
Availability of supplies from your usual suppliers 
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Table A3: Share of firms in manufacturing, trade and business services, who reported need to reduce labour input or alter its composition; and use 
of labour adjustment measures by corresponding firms, % 
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Need to significantly 
reduce labour input or to 
alter its composition? 
If YES, which of the following measures did you use to reduce your labour input or alter its composition when it was most urgent? 
* 
Negative wage 
adjustment * 
Extensive margin 
(collective and 
individual layoffs) 
Intensive margin (subsidised 
and non-subsidised reduction 
of working hours) 
Non-renewal of 
temporary 
contracts at 
expiration 
Freeze of new 
hires 
Temporary 
layoff 
Early 
retirement 
Base 
wage 
Flexible 
wage 
 No Yes 
AT 76.2 23.8 38.8 42.2 4.1 55.2 9.1 1.7 1.8 14.2 
BE 59.8 40.2 46.6 15.5 33.3 62.7 37.7 15.0 5.4 3.8 
BG 76.2 23.8 78.6 14.2 27.6 62.5 31.3 15.4 25.9 38.6 
CY 48.6 51.4 54.5 28.6 19.3 49.3 13.5 7.7 83.1 83.9 
CZ 63.6 36.4 68.2 25.9 38.4 58.0  - 13.0 9.7 31.1 
DE 78.4 21.6 44.5 60.4 28.1 42.9  - 13.3 9.4 8.6 
EE 86.7 13.3 48.8 29.2 13.0 42.0  -  - 22.7 23.4 
ES 54.1 45.9 58.1 34.5 49.2 32.6 24.7 18.4 12.4 44.8 
FR 74.3 25.7 58.1 38.2 47.4 74.4 4.9 7.4 4.4 22.3 
GR 44.7 55.3 37.5 34.0 19.1 59.9 2.8 6.4 78.4 66.8 
HR 60.5 39.5 64.3 13.0 45.7 33.5 8.2 29.5 29.6 38.2 
HU 84.2 15.8 51.2 26.4 24.7 29.9 12.0 16.8 8.4 32.0 
IE 65.8 34.2 54.9 48.7 23.9 52.2 12.1 3.4 25.2 34.9 
IT 53.4 46.6 65.4 89.5 53.1 71.1  - 21.8 5.9 30.0 
LT 80.9 19.1 24.1 13.8 25.0 36.0  - 3.1 16.6 18.9 
LU 74.4 25.6 35.1 19.3 36.5 50.2 4.3 19.6 7.7 37.4 
LV 77.3 22.7 34.0 21.6 10.5 22.8  - 1.5 19.7 12.2 
MT 76.0 24.0 18.8 31.2 17.8 41.0  - 13.2 5.1 2.1 
NL 48.4 51.6 56.8 8.2 53.5 51.8 1.4 9.4 21.8 37.7 
PL 61.7 38.3 70.0 35.3 53.0 72.7 18.8 24.8 8.7 17.0 
PT 74.9 25.1 58.1 28.7 61.8 74.3 6.2 12.9 23.0 39.9 
RO 73.8 26.2 71.8 41.6 31.5 57.5 13.5 11.5 10.2 23.8 
SI 74.0 26.0 56.6 22.2 42.8 49.3 10.8 20.1 32.0 48.6 
SK 66.4 33.6 113.9 27.2 38.4 75.3 8.4 23.4 7.9 36.3 
UK 78.3 21.7 72.6 18.9 13.5 47.3 2.1 2.3 6.1 23.8 
Note: * - share of firms, of those, who reported necessity to reduce labour input or its composition, and used a particular type of labour adjustment moderate or strongly. Sample is 
restricted to manufacturing, trade and business service firms. Data weighted to reflect an overall employment in the country. 
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